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I. AN

INTRODUCTION

In his incisive 2006 book, Blasphemy: Art That Offends,' S. Brent
Plate examined poet T.S. Eliot's famous line "I am reproaching a world
* Ph.D. Student, Osgoode Hall Law School. The author welcomes feedback at
jhaeman@hotmail.com or at http://legalheresy.blog spot.com.
1. S. BRENT PLATE, BLASPHEMY: ART THAT OFFENDS (2006).
187
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in which blasphemy is impossible." 2 "Clearly, he was looking in the
wrong direction[,]" Plate concluded. 3 "We have seen plenty of examples
in which blasphemy has continued to be an issue among religious
revivalists seeking to purge society from its evil images . . . [and]

blasphemy has also moved from the realm of traditional religion into
modem, secular society and the targets of blasphemy have been
redirected."A One could be forgiven for assuming that the concept of
blasphemy would simply fade away over time, swallowed by a
secularization of the world that may have seemed inevitable in Eliot's
time. If blasphemy faded away, what need would there be for
blasphemy laws? Surely, in an age where constitutionalism and
universal declarations of rights have swept the globe,5 blasphemy laws
would be quickly repealed or struck down in light of the clear threats
they present to freedom of expression and religion?
Plate, however, is clearly correct. Blasphemy in its traditional
religious conception still makes newspaper headlines: the anger over the
Danish Muhammad cartoons6 and Salman Rushdie's The Satanic
Verses7 are among the most famous examples. More recently, a new
controversy made front-page headlines and led to rioting around the
world: the "International Bum a Qur'an Day" plan launched by a
Florida pastor.8
However, it would be a mistake to assume that blasphemy still
2.

T.S. ELIOT, AFTER STRANGE GODS (1934), quoted in PLATE, supra note 1, at 133.

3. PLATE, supra note 1, at 133.
4. Id.
5. See John Witte, Jr. & M. Christian Green, Religious Freedom, Democracy, and
InternationalHuman Rights, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 583, 584 (2009) ("Clearly, religion and
freedom do not yet coincide in many countries, however rosy their new constitutional claims are
as to religious rights and freedoms for all. Apostasy, Blasphemy, Conversion, Defamation, and
Evangelization-these are the new alphabet of religious rights violations in a number of regions
around the world.").
6.

See JYTrE KLAUSEN, THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 1 (2009).

7. See R. v. Bow Street Magistrates Court Ex p. Choudhury, [1990] 91 Cr. App. R. 393
(Queen's Bench Div. Ct.) (UK) (dismissing blasphemy charges against the book on theory that
scope of common law prohibition only extends to Christianity).
8. See, e.g., Mitch Potter, Americans RallyingAgainst Qur'an Burning,TORONTO STAR,
SEPT. 7, 2010, available at http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/857888--americansrallying-against-planned-qur-an-burning. As September 11th, the planned date for the burning,
approached, the organizer of the event changed his mind and cancelled it. See Jack Healy &
Steven Erlanger, PlannedKoran BurningDrew InternationalScorn, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/10/world/10react.html. Six months later, Jones
decided to "put the Koran on trial" and then proceeded to burn a copy on Mar. 20, 2011. The act
incited protests and mob violence in Afghanistan, leaving at least 16 people dead and dozens
injured. See Kevin Sieff, FloridaPastorTerry Jones's Koran Burning has Far-reachingEffect,
WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/localleducation/
florida-pastor-terry-joness-koran-buming-has-far-reaching-effect/2011/04/02/AFpiFoQC_story.
html.
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exists only in the Islamic world. Andrew Serrano's "Piss Christ,"9 Chris
Ofili's "Holy Virgin Mary,"t 0 and Yuri Samodurov's and Andrei
Yerofeyev's "Forbidden Art"" all managed to provoke cries of
"blasphemy!" from Christian audiences. Nor have laws against
blasphemy disappeared: all but a handful of countries in Western
Europe maintain them,12 Ireland adopted a new one just last year,' 3 and
even those countries which abolish or allow blasphemy laws to lapse are
prone to adopt new "religious vilification" or "religious hate
propaganda" laws that can work to the same end.' 4 The repeated success
of resolutions to ban the "defamation of religions" in the U.N. General
Assembly 5 is additional evidence that blasphemy as a legal concept is
far from dead.
9. See Archbishop of Melbourne v. Council of Trustees of National Gallery, 1997 WL
1882161(VSC 1997) (dismissing blasphemy charges against artwork on grounds that no
evidence existed of imminent breach of the peace). In Spring 2011, vandals severely damaged
"Piss Christ" by hacking at it with a hammer and a sharp blade while the piece was hanging at a
French gallery. The gallery decided to increase security and continue showing the work in its
damaged state. See Mary Elizabeth Williams, The Endless, Idiotic Outrange About "Piss
Christ," SALON, Apr. 19, 2011, available at http://www.salon.con/news/religion/index.html?
story-/mwt/feature/2011/04/19/andres serrano pisschristattacked.
10. See Hillary Steps Into Dung Art Row, BBC NEWS, Sept. 28, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/459846.stm (discussing Mayor Rudolph Giulianai's threat to cancel
$7,000,000 grant from city to Brooklyn Museum of Art over artwork he states "attack[s] and
bash[es] the Catholic religion").
11. See David Nowak, Russian Curators Sentenced but not Imprisoned, THE GUARDIAN,
July 12, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9169345 (discussing
conviction of museum curators for "inciting religious hatred" for exhibition that included
images of Jesus Christ portrayed as Mickey Mouse).
12.

See ALAIN CABANTOUS,

BLASPHEMY: IMPIOUs SPEECH IN THE WEST FROM THE

SEVENTEENTH TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 263 n.5 (trans. Eric Rauth 2002) ("In western

Europe today only Belgium, Portugal, and France ... have no antiblasphemy laws on the
books"). Since Cabantous' work was published, England replaced its blasphemy law with a law
prohibiting "threatening words or behaviour ... to stir up religious hatred." See Racial and
Religious Hatred Act 2006, 2006, c. 1, § 1, sch. 29B(1).
13. See Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) (Ir.), s. 36, availableat http://www.irish
statutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.003 1.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Charles C. Haynes, Living With our Deepest Differences: Freedom of
Expression in a Religiously Diverse World, in FIDES ET LIBERTAs 2008-2009, at 56, 57 (20082009) ("Instead of eliminating blasphemy laws, some European nations have revised them-or
expanded their application-in order to account for religious pluralism. Thus, the old concern
about blasphemy against the state religion has been replaced by a new concern about hate
speech against religions"); Nicholas Aroney, The Constitutional (In) Validity of Religious
Vilification Laws: Implicationsfor Their Interpretation,34 FED. L. REV. 287 (2006) (discussing
religious vilification laws extant in three Australian states); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697
(upholding constitutionality of Criminal Code prohibition on wilful promotion of hatred towards
identifiable groups, including religious groups). The relationship between blasphemy and
religious vilification or hate propaganda laws will be discussed in the next section.
15.

See U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT

2010, at 336-37 (2010).
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After discussing the role of blasphemy and blasphemy-like laws in
the modem world, this Article discusses three related, but distinct, ways
to think about blasphemy: as a religious concept, as a legal concept,
and, in what at first may seem an oxymoron, "secular blasphemy." The
Article then proceeds to discuss two of the fundamental issues that
underlay the curious persistence of blasphemy and blasphemy laws: (1)
why do people blaspheme to begin with; and (2) what harms, real or
imagined, does blasphemy cause? The theory presented in these pages is
that the concept of blasphemy, in its diverse forms, speaks to a
fundamental element of human psychology: as long as people believe
certain things are sacred, they will believe certain remarks are
blasphemous.

II. BLASPHEMY

LAWS: ALIVE AND STILL
(INTERMITTENTLY) KICKING

A brief survey of recent global developments demonstrates that
blasphemy laws and their derivatives maintain a surprisingly strong
foothold in several jurisdictions. Each of the legal systems discussed
below prohibit blasphemy either directly or through variations of
religious hatred laws that can be (and sometimes are) used to suppress
blasphemous speech. Here, the global drive to constitutionalism pushes
against an ancient and perhaps almost intuitive desire to protect
religious beliefs and believers from "upstarts" who would slander faith.
A. The UnitedNations and "DefamationofReligions"
"A new value is emerging in the realm of the peoples' rights[,]
[because] the United Nations General Assembly has passed a resolution
called[] Combating Defamation of Religions." Indeed, first introduced
into the General Assembly in 2005, the resolution has passed each year
since "by landslide votes." 1 7 The resolution has its origins in a 1999
proposal by Pakistan before the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to
prohibit the "Defamation of Islam."' 8 With the support of the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (comprising 57 Muslim
countries),19 the resolution was broadened to include the protection of
16. Liaquat Ali Khan, Combating Defamation of Religions, THE AMERICAN MUSLIM
(TAM), Jan. 1, 2007, availableat http://www.theamericanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/
combatingdefamation of religions/.
17. Vaughn E. James, Defamation of Religions Versus Freedom of Expression: Finding
the Balance, in FIDES ET LIBERTAS 2008-2009 43,44-45 (2008-2009).
18. See id. at 44.
19. See L. Bennett Graham, Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism?, 23 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 69, 69 (2009).
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all religions and received the support of the Commission (later
Council o) for the last several years, 2 including 2010.22 The resolutions
change slightly each year and are several pages long, but include
passages such as:
[D]efamation of religions is a serious threat to human dignity
leading to restriction on the freedom of religion of their adherents
and incitement to religious hatred and violence. 23
Defamation of religions and incitement to religious hatred in
general could lead to social disharmony and violations of human
rights, and [the Council is] alarmed at the inaction of some States
to combat this burgeoning trend and the resulting discriminatory
practices against adherents of certain reliions... in general and
against Islam and Muslims in particular.2
[The Council notes] the various regional and national initiatives
to combat religious and racial intolerance against specific groups
and communities and emphasiz[es], in this context, the need to
adopt a comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach to
ensure respect for all races and religions. 25
Thus, the resolutions are couched in rather broad terms and provide
no definition for the term "defamation of religions." 26 The inherent
vagueness of the resolutions is alarming to the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom:
The "defamation of religions" resolutions purport to seek
protection for religions in general, but the only religion and
20.

The U.N. Commission on Human Rights was replaced by the U.N. Human Rights

Council in 2006. See U.S. COMMIsSIoN ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 15,

at 227.
21. See James, supra note 17, at 44.
22. See UNHRC Votes by Narrower Margin to Condemn "Defamation of Religion"
RELIGION AND LAW CONSORTIUM, Mar. 2010, available at http://religlaw.org/index.php?blurb_
id=803&pageid=19 (noting "[tjhis marks the eleventh time in the past twelve years that such a
resolution has been passed by the Council").
23. H.R.C. Res. GE.09-12613, A/HRC/10/L.2/Rev/1, 10th Sess., (Mar. 26, 2009).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Jaime Contreras & Rosa Maria Martinez De Codes, Culturaland Legal Issues
Concerning Defamation of Religions, in FIDES ET LIBERTAS 2008-2009 31, 38 (2008-2009)

("there are a number of provisions that condemn defamation ... stress the connection between
defamation of religions and incitement to religious hatred . .. [and] mention that defamation of
religions could lead to social disharmony and violations of human rights-but there is not one
single definition of 'defamation of religions').
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religious adherents specifically mentioned are Islam and
Muslims. Aside from Islam, the resolutions do not specify which
religions are deserving of protection, or explain how or by whom
this would be determined. The resolutions also do not define
what would make a statement defamatory to religions or explain
who decides this question. For its part, the [Organization of the
Islamic Conference] appears to consider any speech that the
organization, or even a single cleric or individual, deems critical
of or offensive to Islam or Muslims to automatically constitute
religious defamatory speech. 27
The resolutions are non-binding, and thus impose no obligations on
State actors to implement the principles contained within. However, at
least one supporter argues that such resolutions may, over time, "pave
the way for the formation of a multilateral treaty or customary
international law," and thus "cannot be dismissed as mere opinions."
Western countries and NGOs have lobbied furiously against the
resolutions in recent years, and the 2010 resolution before the Human
Rights Council passed by its narrowest margin to date. 29
The relationship between "defamation of religions" and blasphemy
is clear. The originator and prime proponent of the resolutions is
Pakistan, a country notorious for using its domestic blasphemy laws to
suppress religious dissent or difference. 30 As Rebecca Dobras notes,
"[h]uman rights organizations and several Western governments worry
that the Defamation Resolutions bring blasphemy laws into the
international arena."I The U.S. Commission on International Religious
27.

See U.S. COMMIssION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 336.

Scholars note the difficulty in applying the traditional legal concept of "defamation" in the
context of criticism of religious beliefs, as the truth or falsity of such statements are not capable
of being resolved by a judge or jury. See Graham, supra note 19, at 76; Contreras & Martinez
De Codes, supra note 26, at 35.
28. Khan, supra note 16. Khan argues that laws prohibiting the defamation of religions
are "morally sound" but pose drafting challenges to ensure that they comply with freedom of
speech. See id. See also James, supra note 17, at 46 ("combating 'defamation of religions' is a
desirable goal, at least as long as the actions taken to achieve this goal are designed to cover all
religions").
29. See UNHRC Votes by Narrower Margin to Condemn "Defamation of Religion,"
RELIGION AND LAW CONSORTIUM, Mar. 2010, available at http://religlaw.org/index.php?blurb
id=803&page id=19.
30. See Rebecca J. Dobras, Is the United Nations Endorsing Human Rights Violations?:
An Analysis of the United Nations' Combating Defamation of Religions Resolutions and
Pakistan'sBlasphemy Laws, 37 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 339 (2009).
31. Id. at 378. See also id. at 369 ("Human Rights Watch argues that the Defamation
Resolutions serve as an international endorsement of the blasphemy laws, which may give some
justification to the violation of essential human rights, such as freedom of religion and freedom
of speech").
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Freedom, for example, argues that
[I]n essence, the "defamation of religions" campaign is an
attempt to export to the international level the repressive
blasphemy laws found in some [Organization of the Islamic
Conference] countries. . . . [T]hese laws allow repressive

governments and religious extremists to suppress and punish
whatever they deem to be offensive or unacceptable speech about
a particular favored religion or sect. 32
The fear of an international consensus that civil liberties concerns must
give way to protecting religious sensibilities is exacerbated by three
court decisions which held that the domestic blasphemy laws of
signatory nations were consistent with the European Convention on
Human Rights.33
B. Ireland's SurprisingResurrectionof Blasphemy
Ireland has had a strange and surprising relationship with blasphemy
laws. The earliest reported common law prosecution for blasphemy
dates back to 1703, and a couple of other prosecutions have been
discovered dating back to the mid-1800s. 3 Despite there not having
been a prosecution since 1855,36 the framers of the Irish Constitution of
1937 decided to include, as an exception to the document's free speech
guarantee, a statement that "[t]he publication or utterance of
blasphemous ...

matter is an offence which shall be punishable in

accordance with the law." 37 Still, the legal concept of blasphemy
32.

See U.S. CoMMIssIoN ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 337.

33. See Wingrove v. United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1997);
Otto-Preminger Institute v. Austria, App. No. A/295-A, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34; Gay News Ltd. v.
United Kingdom, App. No. 8710/79, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123 (1983). See also Susannah C. Vance,
The Permissibility of Incitement to Religious Hatred Offenses Under European Convention
Principles, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 201 (2004); Natan Lerner, Report on the
Human Rights Council Subcommittee, in FIDES ET LIBERTAS 2008-2009 25, 29 (2008-2009)
("The issue of blasphemy has not been satisfactorily taken care of by the international legal
community.").

34.

See Paul O'Higgins, Blasphemy in Irish Law, 23 MOD. L. REV. 151, 159 (1960). See

generally NEVILLE Cox, BLASPHEMY AND THE LAW IN IRELAND (2000).

35. See O'Higgins,supra note 34, at 161, 163.
36. See Kathryn A. O'Brien, Ireland'sSecular Revolution: The Waning Influence of the
Catholic Church and the Future of Ireland's Blasphemy Law, 18 CONN. J. INT'L L. 395, 396
(2002).
37. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 40(6)(1)(i). See also Stephen Ranalow, Bearing a
Constitutional Cross: Examining Blasphemy and the Judicial Role in Corway v. Indep.
Newspapers, 3 TRINITY COLL. L. REV. 95, 95 (2000) ("The crime of blasphemy enshrined in [the

Irish Constitution] is something of a constitutional oddity. The existence of a penal clause
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seemed a dead letter for decades until, a full 141 years after its last
invocation, a prosecution was brought in 1996.
The case, Corway v. Independent Newspapers (Ireland)Limited,
originated as a private prosecution against a newspaper for publishing a
cartoon that allegedly made fun of priests and the Eucharist. 39 Because
the trial judge refused to allow the prosecution to go forward, the case
made its way up to the Supreme Court of Ireland, which dismissed the
appeal on the unusual ground that there was no way of adequately
determining the operative elements of blasphemy as a criminal
offence. 40 According to the Court, Irish common law was unclear on the
actus reus and mens rea of blasphemy, 4 1 and the Legislature had not
"adverted to the problem of adapting the common law crime of
blasphemy to the circumstances of a modem State which embraces
citizens of many different religions and which guarantees freedom of
conscience and a free profession and practice of religion." 42 The Court
therefore concluded that "[t]here is no doubt that the crime of
blasphemy exists as an offence in Irish Law because the Constitution
says so[,]" 43 but that no 4rosecution could be authorized in the absence
of a statutory definition. The professed inability of Ireland's supreme
judicial body to define the elements of a long-standing common law
crime struck commentators (including myself) as disingenuous, 45 but in
any event the issue seemed settled. As one not-so-prescient scholar
wrote "given the unlikelihood of the Legislature suddenly deciding to
define the elements of the crime, there is no longer a prohibition on
within what is essentially a political declaration seems inappropriate . . . [but] [t]he absence of a
blasphemy prosecution in Ireland since 1855 had meant that the unusual status of this offence
was an issue of limited interest").
38. Corway v. Indep. Newspapers (Ir.) Ltd., [2000] 1 ILRM 426 (30 July 1999) (S.C.)
(Ir.) available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IESC/1999/5.html. See also Cox, supra note 34,
at 53-64.
39. See Corway, 1 ILRM 426,
5-8.
40. See id. IT 10-41 .
41. See id. T 38.
42. Id. T 36.
43. Id.
44. See id. T 38.
45. See Ranalow, supra note 37, at 100 ("Given the relevance of the judicial, statutory
and historical authority just outlined, the Supreme Court's refusal to clarify blasphemy on the
grounds of uncertainty is unconvincing"); Jeremy Patrick, Not Dead, Just Sleeping: Canada's
Prohibitionon Blasphemous Libel as a Case Study in Obsolete Legislation, 41 U.B.C. L. REV.
193, 210 (2008) ("This result-passing the buck back to the Legislature-was an institutionally
canny move by the Court, but upon close examination the rationale seems dubious"). To be fair,
O'Higgins's 1960 article does state "[as to] the effect of the provisions of the Constitution on
criminal responsibility for blasphemous offences, there is no case law here to guide us to the
answer[,]" and "[t]he conclusion is then forced upon us that there is considerable doubt as to the
meaning of the term 'blasphemous' as used in the Irish Constitution[.]" See O'Higgins, supra
note 34, at 165, 166.
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blasphemy in Ireland.,46
Then, almost fifteen years after Corway, and seemingly out of the
blue, the Legislature suddenly decided to define the elements of
blasphemy. According to the Defamation Act 2009:
[A] person publishes or utters blasphemous matter if (a) he or she
publishes or utters matter that is grossly abusive or insulting in
relation to matters held sacred by any religion, thereby causing
outrage among a substantial number of the adherents of that
religion, and (b) he or she intends, by the publication or utterance
of the matter concerned, to cause such outrage.4 7
The Minister of Justice responsible for the move, Dermot Ahern,
stated that he could not "wilfully ignore the Constitution" and was
"bemused" by criticism. 48 Although the statute goes on to provide an
affirmative defence for publications of "genuine literary, artistic,
political, scientific, or academic value," 49 it provoked a countermovement which advocated a repeal of the law and a referendum on
removing the blasphemy provision from the Constitution entirely.50 In
March of 2010, Minister of Justice Ahern agreed to hold a referendum
on the topic by the end of the year. 5 '
C. From Blasphemy to Vilification: The Australian Transition
Australia provides an intriguing example of the global trend towards
transitioning away from blasphemy laws and toward religious
vilification laws. 52 Blasphemy laws and religious vilification laws are
not the same thing, nor is disparaging religious beliefs the same as
disparaging religious believers. However, although conceptually quite
distinct, blasphemy laws and religious vilification laws can seem
identical to the defendant in trouble for angering a particular religious
46. Patrick, supra note 45, at 211.
47. Defamation Act 2009 (Act No. 31/2009) (Ir.), s. 36(2), available at
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2009/en.act.2009.003 1.pdf. The crime is punishable by a fine
of up to 25,000 euros. See id. s. 36(1).
48. Elaine Edwards, Atheists Rally Over Blasphemy Law, IRISH TIMES, JAN. 4, 2010,
availableat http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/0104/1224261600743_pf.html.
49. See Defamation Act 2009, supra note 47.
50. See Irish Atheists Use Bjork, Mark Twain to Challenge Blasphemy Law, CNN, Jan.
02, 2010, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-02/worldlireland.blasphemy.law 1
blasphemy-law-religion-irish?_s=PM:WORLD (discussing Irish atheist group's publication of
famously "blasphemous" quotations to challenge law); Edwards, supra note 48.
51. See Carol Coulter, Ahern to Propose Blasphemy Amendment, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 17,
2010, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/2010/03137/1224266442534
_pf.html.
52. England and Canada are other good examples.
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group. Although this issue will be revisited in Section V.C, the
following discussion provides important background information for the
debate.
Blasphemy laws have a long history in Australia. With British
settlers usually came British common law, and Australia was no
exception. The English common law prohibition on blasphemy was
received and implemented by some of the jurisdictions which would
eventually become Australian States. 53 Even before Federation in 1901,
prosecutions for blasphemy took place on Australian soil. Peter
Coleman, for example, writes about the successful 1871 prosecution of
a Unitarian street preacher named Lorando Jones for blasphemy. 54 Jones
was giving a lecture in a Sydney park when he was arrested after having
denied belief in the divinity of Jesus and the sacred nature of the
Bible. 5 The jury did not even deliberate before finding Jones guilty,
and the man spent several weeks in jail before being released on his
own recognizance. 56 The occasional suppression of blasphemy
continued after Federation, as evidenced by the Post Office denying a
mailing permit because a freethinker newspaper published cartoons
making fun of God in 1911,57 and the 1919 prosecution for blasphemy
of a Communist newspaper for publishing a satire of what would
happen if Bolsheviks invaded Heaven.
The most recent high-profile attempt to invoke the common law of
blasphemy in Australia was a mid-1990s private prosecution brought by
a Catholic archbishop against a museum for displaying Andres
Serrano's "Piss Christ," a work of art which involved a photograph of a
crucifix suspended in a bottle of the artist's urine. 59 The prosecution
53. See Reid Mortensen, Blasphemy in a Secular State: A Pardonable Sin?, 17
U.N.S.W.L.J. 409, 417 (1994) ("[Un practice, it has been assumed that the law was received in
New South Wales and several British colonies. Prosecutions for blasphemous libel at common
law have been brought in New South Wales and Victoria"). Mortensen also notes that a
statutory ban on blasphemy was enacted as early as 1827 in New South Wales. See id.
54.

PETER COLEMAN, OBSCENITY, BLASPHEMY, SEDITION: 100 YEARS OF CENSORSHIP IN

AUSTRALIA 65-67 (rev. ed. 1974).
55. See id. at 65-66.
56. See id. at 66-67. Coleman states that "[tihe outrageous character of the case made the
idea of prosecuting people for blasphemy so unpopular that it was largely responsible for finally
killing the idea of blasphemy as a crime." See id. at 65.
57. See id. at 71-73.
58. See id. at 72-74. Coleman states that this case "is the last in which a Government
instrumentality has taken action against a publication for its blasphemy." See id. at 74. I have
not independently verified this statement, but no obvious counter-examples come to mind.
59. See Archbishop of Melb. v. Council of Trs. of Nat'l Gallery, 1997 WL 1882161, at
*2 (VSC 1997). See also Bede Harris, Pell v. Council of Trustees of the National Gallery of
Victoria: Should Blasphemy Be a Crime? The 'Piss Christ' Case and Freedom of Expression,
22 MELB. U. L. REV. 217, 217 (1998). A reproduction of Serrano's piece can be found in PLATE,
supra note 1, at 133.
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was dismissed in an opinion that expressed doubts as to whether or not
the offence of blasphemy had lapsed due to desuetude,6 0 and held that,
even if blasphemy were still an offence at common law, "there is no
evidence ... of any unrest of any kind following or likely to follow the
showing of the photograph in question."6 1 Ironically, "[t]he court's
finding that no such disturbance was apprehended was, unfortunately,
not borne out by subsequent events-vandals damaged the work and the
gallery withdrew the exhibit for fear of injury to its staff should another
attack be mounted." 62
Although rarely invoked, blasphemy to this day remains a common
law offense in New South Wales and Victoria, and a statutory crime in
Tasmania. 63 The status of blasphemy as an offence remains unclear in
South Australia, Norfolk Island, and the Northern Territory,64 and only
in the States of Queensland and Western Australia has it been
conclusively abolished.6 5 There is no Federal prohibition on blasphemy,
but Federal courts have, in dicta, assumed that blasphemy remains a part
of the common law with a meaning similar to that given by English
courts. 66
As the legal enforcement of blasphemy laws have waned, new
offences have taken their place: religious vilification laws. In the past
two decades, three Australian States (Victoria, Queensland, and
Tasmania) have enacted such laws,67 which, for example, prohibit
speech that "incites hatred against, serious contempt for, or revulsion or
severe ridicule" of persons on the basis of their "religious belief or

60. See Archbishop of Melbourne, 1997 WL 1882161, at **1-6.
61. Id. at *6. Thus, the Court implicitly adopted the controversial view that the crime of
blasphemy includes a requirement that the prosecution prove that the impugned material has a
tendency to create a breach of the peace. See Harris,supra note 59, at 218-19, 226.
62. Harris, supra note 59, at 226.
63. See Mortensen, supra note 53, at 417-18. For Tasmania, see Criminal Code Act 1924
(Tas) s 119 (Austl.). For New South Wales, see Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 574 (Austl.) (limiting
common law prosecutions for blasphemy to cases that include "scoffing or reviling," "violating
public decency," or "tending to a breach of the peace").
64. See Mortensen, supra note 53, at 417-18.
65. See id.
66. See Archbishop of Melbourne v. Council of Trustees of National Gallery, 1997 WL
1882161, at *4 (VSC 1997) ("Not only may there be a place in a multicultural society for the
offen[s]e of blasphemous libel of any recognized faith, but the ancient misdemeanour of that
name may have survived transportation to the colonies. Certainly, there is a body of judicial
opinion to the effect that it has") (referencing Ogle v. Strickland, (1987) 13 FCR 306)). See also
Harris,supra note 59, at 218.
67. See Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic) s 8 (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination
Act 1998 (Tas) ss 17, 19 (Austl.); Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) ss 124, 131 (Austl.). See
also Aroney, supra note 14, at 287-88; Dermot Feenan, Religious Vilification Laws: Quelling
Fires ofHatred?, 31 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 153, 153 (2006).
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activity."68 Unless threats are involved, the laws do not carry the
criminal sanction of imprisonment, 6 9 but the possibility of fines,
injunctions, and simply the time and money involved in defending
against an allegation of "religious vilification" could be enough to chill
speech on religious topics. 70 The laws include an affirmative defense:
for example, that the speech was made "reasonably and in good faith"
for a "genuine academic, artistic, religious, or scientific purpose."7 1 This
may shield some defendants, but "[o]nce it is shown that the speech in
question promotes or incites hatred it is natural to reach the conclusion
that the labels 'good faith' and 'reasonable' do not apply." 72
A recent case, Catch the Fire Ministries v. Islamic Council of
Victoria, has drawn the attention of several Australian legal
commentators who view it as an important example of the potential
dangers religious vilification laws pose to freedom of speech and
religion. 74 Catch the Fire involved remarks made by a Christian
minister, Pastor Scot, during a seminar at a Victorian church. Pastor
Scot, an immigrant to Australia, had fled Pakistan after being accused of
blasphemy, 76 and his analysis of Islam and the Qur'an during the
seminar led to him being brought up on religious vilification charges
before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal
68. Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, supra note 67. Aroney notes that the
religious vilification laws of the three states "are sufficiently similar that the considerations
relevant to their constitutionality are substantially the same." Aroney, supra note 14, at 289. To
my mind, the most troubling phrase in the laws is the prohibition of "severe ridicule" of
religious groups, which could easily be interpreted to outlaw works of comedy and satire. See
Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, supra note 67.
69. See Aroney, supra note 14, at 290 (distinguishing civil or "ordinary" vilification with
criminal or "serious" vilification).
70. See Rex Tauati Ahdar, Religious Vilification: Confused Policy, Unsound Principle
and Unfortunate Law, 26 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 293, 297 (2007) ("The risk of expensive and
protracted litigation is heightened by the vagueness of the law. Precisely at what point do we
move from strong, even hostile, criticism of religion to attempts to stir up hatred of believers in
that religion?"); Feenan, supra note 67, at 156 ("The danger in framing religious vilification as a
wrong lies partly in the fact that it may capture views which represent legitimate disagreements
about the appropriateness of different religious beliefs or practices").
71. Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001, supra note 67.
72. Joel Harrison, Truth, Civility, and Religious Battlegrounds: The Contest Between
Religious Vilification Laws and Freedom of Expression, 12 AUCKLAND U. L. REv. 71, 80
(2006); see also Aroney, supra note 14, at 315 ("it is not exactly clear how a 'reasonableness'
requirement can or ought to apply to religious speech").
73. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. v. Islamic Council of Victoria Inc., (2006) 235 ALR
750 (Vic.).
74. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 72; Ahdar, supra note 70; Feenan, supra note 67.
1, 4(1). The case also involved a
75. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc., 235 ALR 750,
newsletter and website posting issued by the Christian group. See id 4(2)-(3).
76. See Ahdar, supranote 70, at 303.
77. Catch the Fire Ministries Inc., 235 ALR 750, 1 1.
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found that Scot misrepresented the Qur'an by implying that it promotes
violence and the subjugation of women, that he stated or implied that
Muslims are demons and plan to take over Australia, that he stated
Allah is not merciful, and more.7 8 The Tribunal was not persuaded that
Pastor Scot's other remarks that Christians should love and witness to
Muslims cured the fault, 79 and therefore concluded that on the whole he
"incited hatred and contempt of and revulsion towards the religious
beliefs of Muslims[.]"8 0 Further, his affirmative defense failed in part
because of his inability "to put forward an honest and fair representation
of Islam." 8 1 The Tribunal ordered Pastor Scot and the ministry to place
on their newsletter, website, and in local newspaper advertisements, a
statement written by the Tribunal that included the following sentence:
[The Tribunal] found the seminar was not a balanced discussion,
that Pastor Scot presented the seminar in a way that was
essentially hostile, demeaning and derogatory of all Muslim
people, their God, their prophet Mohammed and in general
Muslim beliefs and practices, that Pastor Scot was not a credible
witness and that he did not act reasonably and in good faith....
[Pastor Scot] acknowledges the findings [that the statements
breached the Act] and will in future refrain from making,
publishing, or distributing . . . any statements, suggestions, or

implications to the same or similar effect. 82
If Pastor Scot said what the Tribunal said he said, then his having
been guilty of committing religious vilification is not particularly
surprising, regardless of whether or not such laws are a good idea.
However, when the case went to the Victorian Court of Appeal, the
Court conducted a long and exhaustive assessment of Scot's statements
and concluded that the Tribunal had made an erroneous interpretation of
his words on almost every count. 83 The Court found that the Tribunal's
concern with "balanced" or "unbalanced" discussions of Islam was
misplaced,8 4 and that the Tribunal failed to distinguish between hatred
of Muslims and hatred of Muslim beliefs.ss The Tribunal's holding was
vacated and the case was remanded to be heard before a different
judge, 86 but the five-year battle ended before that happened, when
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See id. 25.
Id. 26.
Id. 5 (paraphrase by appellate court).
Id. 85.
See id Annexure.
See id. 38-63.
See id. 64.
See id. 32.
See Ahdar, supra note 70, at 305.
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mediation between the parties was successful in settling the matter.
At first glance, the saga of the Catch the Fire case might be seen as
an example of how "the system worked," with appellate courts acting as
guarantors of free speech and religion. The problem, however, is that
the decision "valiantly endeavoured to clarify the law but actually
generated new uncertainties,"" and is seen by one commentator as "the
best argument against religious vilification [laws]" because it "bears out
the concerns of many that [such laws] are conceptually unsound and
produce results antithetical to the religious tolerance its promoters hope
for." 89 Courts and administrative tribunals are inevitably going to
struggle in the morass generated by trying to decide when allowable
criticism turns into forbidden contempt, revulsion, and ridicule, if
criticism of beliefs can be distinguished between criticism of believers,
whether the "truth" of statements about religion can or should be
considered, and whether, if ever, strong and passionate criticism of
religious beliefs can be made "reasonably" and in "good faith." These
are the sorts of issues that lead some to fear that "religious vilification
laws are potentially a new form of blasphemy law." 90
D. Pakistan:Public Law and Private Violence
Many countries flirt with blasphemy laws, but Pakistan embraces
them.9 ' Enacted during dictator General Zia-ul-Haq's decade-long
control of the country from 1977 to 1988,92 the laws were seen as
corresponding to the general push toward the "Islamization" of
Pakistan. 93 Some of the laws are crafted to capture and outlaw the

87. Id.
88. Id. at 314.
89. Id. at 293-94. Aroney notes that "religious vilification laws legitimate the use of State
power to intervene in inter-religious disputes, often by enforcing the claims of one religious
group against another." Aroney, supra note 14, at 316. This seems to be a good description of
what happened in Catch the Fire.
90. Harrison, supra note 72, at 77.
91. See Osama Siddique & Zahra Hayat, Unholy Speech and Holy Laws: Blasphemy
Laws in Pakistan-Controversial Origins, Design Defects, and Free Speech Implications, 17
MINN. J. INT'L L. 303, 305 (2008) ("Though blasphemy laws are not peculiar to Pakistan, they
arguably exist in a more problematic and controversial form in that country than in others").
92. See id at 310-11.
93. See Dobras, supra note 30, at 348 ("In the 1980s, the fundamentalists took
Islamization to an even greater extreme by pressuring the government to specifically limit the
freedom of religious minorities, culminating in the passage of the five ordinances that make up
the blasphemy laws"). See generally David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10
CONN. J. INT'L L. 27, 28 (1994) ("[L]aws directly criminalizing apostasy and blasphemy are
reaching a crescendo of support among certain Muslim segments in many countries, to the
dismay of many other Muslims, and to the detriment of minority religions").
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beliefs of a particular minority religious group (Ahmadis),94 but others
are more general in nature and punish insults of the Qur'an and
Muhammad (including his wives and family members).9 5 The laws are
written in broad language and include severe punishments, such as this
one titled "Use of derogatory remarks; in respect of the Holy Prophet,"
which reads:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
representation, or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation,
directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet
Mohammed (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a fine. 96
A mixed picture emerges when considering the actual enforcement
of blasphemy laws in Pakistan. They are easily manipulated for personal
vendettas because "a mere accusation of blasphemy is sufficient for
arrest ... warrants are not required and investigations typically are not
conducted." 9 7 Statistics based on reported cases show dozens of
prosecutions have taken place,9 8 but those convicted by trial courts are
almost invariably acquitted and set free by appellate courts. 99 Although
ultimate exoneration does not return the years spent in prison waiting
for justice to slowly wind its way through the Pakistani legal system,
it is an indication that the system is capable of resisting, to at least some
degree, the pressure exerted by Islamic fundamentalists to punish
blasphemy in a swift and merciless fashion.
Perhaps the greatest danger posed to those accused of blasphemy in
Pakistan is the "private justice" of vigilante violence.101 Accused
blasphemers have been gunned down outside the courthouse,' 0 2 lynched
by co-workers,' 03 and stabbed to death.104 Rebecca Dobras summarizes
the problem:
94. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 91, at 310 n.8 (reproducing text of laws) & 312
n. 10 (describing beliefs of the Ahmadis).
95. See Pak. Penal Code. Ch. XV ss. 295-B, 295-C, 298-A.
96. Id. s. 295-C.
97. Dobras, supra note 30, at 357. Dobras notes that "individuals can accuse others of
blasphemy for a variety of reasons other than religion, such as economic or professional rivalry,
personal grudges, intimidation, or political clashes." Id.
98. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 91, at 325 tbl. D.
99. See Dobras, supra note 30, at 358.
100. See id. at 358-59.
101. See Forte, supra note 93, at 60 ("N]ot only are charges of blasphemy often lodged
for personal and political motives, but once brought, the accused is subjected to acts of private
violence").
102. See Siddique & Hayat, supra note 91, at 329.
103. See Dobras, supra note 30, at 374.
104. See Forte, supra note 93, at 60-61.
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[G]iven the general climate of religious intolerance and the lack
of protection afforded by the government . .. [t]hose accused of

or charged with blasphemy often face violence from private
citizens. Even those individuals who are found innocent by the
court system often have to go into hiding and seek asylum
elsewhere as a 1result
of the many death threats they and their
05
families receive.
Legislative attempts to add increased procedural protections for
accused blasphemers have failed in recent years due to the public's
overwhelming support of blasphemy laws.10 6 In February 2010,
Pakistan's Minister for Religious Affairs announced that the
government was "holding consultative meetings with representatives of
minorities and political parties, as well as with Muslim clerics" on how
the blasphemy laws could be altered to limit their "misuse" by extremist
groups. 7 The laws continue in force as of this writing, with their most
recent high-profile invocation centering on whether the entirety of
Facebook should be permanently banned in the country due to usergenerated content like "Everybody Draw Muhammad Day" and
"Everybody Burn Qur'an Day." o In March 2011, this official, Shabaz
Bhatti, was assassinated by the Taliban. The terrorist organization
attributed the murder to Bhatti's support of blasphemy law reform.109
E. CanadaandEngland: Examples ofPersistentBlasphemy Laws
Examples of the continuing persistence of blasphemy laws and their
modern-day counterparts could easily be multiplied if time and space
were of no concern. Canada retains a law against "blasphemous libel"
on the statute books,o10 and the religious hate speech laws of one of its
105. Dobras,supra note 30, at 358-59. See also Siddique & Hayat, supra note 91, at 327.
106. See Dobras,supra note 30, at 375; Siddique & Hayat, supra note 91, at 379 n.332.
107. See Zeeshan Haider, Pakistan Intends to Alter Blasphemy Law, REUTERS, Feb. 25,
2010, availableat http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE610 1M820100225.
108. See Babar Dogar, Facebook Banned in Pakistan, TORONTO STAR, May 19, 2010,
available at http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/811422--facebook-banned-in-pakistan
(reporting temporary ban); Howard Friedman, PakistanCourt HearsArguments on Permanently
Banning Facebook Over Blasphemous Pages, Religion Clause Blog, Aug. 5, 2010, availableat
http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2010/08/pakistan-court-hears-arguments-on.html.
109. See Samson Desta, Taliban: Pakistani Minister Killed over Stance on Blasphemy
Law, CNN, Mar. 2, 2011, available at http://edition.cnn.com/201 I/WORLD/asiapcf/03/02/
pakistan.minister.shot/?hpt-T2. Three months before Bhatti's assassination, the governor of
Pakistan's Punjab province was assassinated by his own bodyguard over his support for
blasphemy law reform. See Unsigned, Pakistani Leader Shot Dead by Own Bodyguard, USA
TODAY, Jan. 4, 2011, available at http://www.uatoday.com/news/world/2011-01-04-pakistanigovernor-killed_N.htm.
110. See Patrick,supra note 45, at 193.
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provinces led to human rights commission hearinps for a magazine that
England abolished
reprinted the Danish Muhammad cartoons."
2
blasphemy as a common law offense,"l but invoked its new Religious
and Racial Hatred Act against six men who burned the Koran and
posted the video on YouTube." Any predictions that blasphemy laws
would simply fade away in the wake of increasing secularization or
constitutionalization are simply mistaken.

III. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF BLASPHEMY
What is blasphemy? No simple answer exists, because a crucial
aspect of the question is "who is asking" and "for what purpose?" 1 4
Blasphemy as a concept (legal and otherwise) is "contested, fluid, and
and "genuinely
"complex and protean[,]"" 6
dynamic[,]"" 5
17
In a very general sense, blasphemy can be thought of as
indefinable."
an inevitable side effect whenever the barrier between the sacred and
the profane is breached. As Plate notes, "blasphemy is fundamentally
about transgression, about crossing the lines between the sacred and
profane in seemingly improper ways."" 8
Blasphemy can simultaneously be conceptualized as a unifying and
a divisive force. On the one hand, blasphemy is a persistent concept that
ties together the ancient and modern worlds, links East and West,
111.

See Conservative Who Published Prophet Cartoons Faces Rights Commission"

CANWEST NEWS SERV., Jan. 10, 2008, available at http://www.canada.com/topics/news/story.

html?id=6edbee05-bec3-46cO-aa22-fl6cf3fOacbl&k-90175.
112. See Martin Beckford, Blasphemy Laws are Lifted, TELEGRAPH, May 10, 2008,
availableat http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1942668/ Blasphemy-laws-are-lifted.html.
113. See Men Arrested in GatesheadOver Suspected Koran Burning, BBC NEWS, Sept.
23, 2010, availableat http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-tyne- 11396980.
114. See, e.g., Address to the Jury by Robert Ingersoll, Trial of C.B. Reynolds for
Blasphemy at Morristown, N.J. (1887), available at http://www.infidels.org/library/historical/
robert ingersoll/blasphemytrial.html ("Now gentlemen, what is blasphemy? Of course nobody
knows what it is, unless he takes into consideration where he is. What is blasphemy in one
country would be a religious exhortation in another. It is owing to where you are and who is in
authority").
115.

PLATE, supranote 1, at 27.

116.

LEONARD W.

LEVY, TREASON

AGAINST GOD: A HISTORY OF THE OFFENSE OF

BLASPHEMY 4 (1981) [hereinafter "Treason"].
117.

Joss

MARSH,

WORD

CRIMES:

BLASPHEMY,

CULTURE,

AND

LITERATURE

IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 7 (1998).

118. PLATE, supra note 1, at 43. See also MARSH, supra note 117, at 7 ("blasphemy marks
the moving boundary line between the permissible and the prohibited; it is always what you may
not say; always whatever affronts what the people, or the people in power, put their faith inGod, religion, nature, art, even democracy, freedom, or childhood innocence."). On the idea of
the "sacred" and the "profane," see the seminal work by MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE
PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION (trans. Willard R. Trask 1957).
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Muslim and Christian. No specific idea or act is inherently
blasphemous, as blasphemy is a historically contingent concept that will
vary in form from age to age, place to place, and culture to culture." 9
However, any culture that has religion or taboos acquires, to some
degree or another, the notion of blasphemy because the idealized
conception of the "sacred" cannot exist without a reciprocal belief that
the sacred should not be tainted with the profane.12 0 In a less abstract
sense, cries of "blasphemy" can give strength and unity to a society as it
bands together to punish and cast out those who would mock or criticize
the sacred. On the other hand, blasphemy caused by differing
understandings of what is sacred can tear groups (religious, cultural,
political, ethnic) apart, and lead to outrage, schism, or even violence.
Indeed, the intense negative emotions-anger, grief, hatred-associated
with blasphemy is one of the characteristics that distinguish it from
mere disagreement on theological or political points.
The concept of blasphemy can be fruitfully understood from at least
three different viewpoints: as a religious concept, as a legal concept, and
as a secular and cultural concept. These three conceptions of blasphemy
often intersect and reinforce one another, without necessarily leading to
identical conclusions about what is or is not "blasphemy."
Blasphemy is most commonly thought of as a religious concept, and
notions of what is blasphemous will thus differ from religion to religion.
To give a few examples, Judaism places strictures upon the use of
God's name 12 1 Islam prohibits images of Allah and the Prophet
Muhammad,' 22 and Christianity makes blaspheming against the Holy
Spirit an unforgivable offense. As a religious concept, blasphemy can
be intra-faith (originating within a religious group, and thus akin to
heresy), inter-faith (when adherents of one religion or denomination
blaspheme against another), or extra-faith (when non-believers
blaspheme). Of course, "one erson's blasphemy can be someone else's
deep-seated pious belief,"' 2 and the invocation of the concept in a
religious context can be viewed in everything from the Biblical trial of
Jesus to the Protestant Reformation to the continuing persecution of
Ahmadis in Pakistan. The ability of religious groups to police their
ranks and purge them of blasphemy depends on how much influence the
119. See PLATE, supra note 1, at 125.
120. See id. at 37 ("[T~he sacred and the profane need each other for their very definitions.
The sacred provides meaning and orientation for the profane; the profane sustains the sacred").
121. See id. at 968.
122. See M.K. Hassanvand, A Survey of Prohibition of Painting in Islam, 11 J.
HUMANITIES 31, 33, 38, 42 (2004).
123. See Matthew 12:31-32.
124. Daniel J. Lasker, Blasphemy: Jewish Concept, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION 968,
970 (Lindsay Jones ed., 2d ed. 2005).
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religion has with civil authorities. On their own, religious groups must
resort to denouncement, demotion, and excommunication. With the
assistance of the State, however, far more severe punishments become
available.
As a legal concept, blasphemy in the Western common law tradition
was originally defined as "contumelious reproaches of God or the
religion established."l 25 An American case from 1838 stated that:
In general blasphemy may be described, as consisting in speaking
evil of the Deity with an impious purpose to derogate from the
divine majesty, and to alienate the minds of others from the love
and reverence of God. It is purposely using words concerning
God, calculated and designed to impair and destroy the
reverence, respect, and confidence due to him, as the intelligent
creator, governor and judge of the world . . . It is a wilful and
malicious attempt to lessen men's reverence of God.126
Over time, the substance of an impugned statement was viewed as
less problematic than was the manner in which it was uttered, leading to
the famous dictum that "[i]f the decencies of controversy are observed,
even the fundamentals of religion may be attacked[.]"l 27 A tendency for
the statement to breach the peace became seen by some judges as an
essential element of the offense, 128 and statutory versions usually
included affirmative defences for speech made "in good faith" for
various purposes.12 9 Of course, generalizations about the "Western
125. See Cox, supra note 34, at 6-7 (quoting Hale); see State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39, 41
(Me. 1921) (quoting Blackstone). See also LEVY, supranote 116, at 313-14. A fuller discussion
of the evolution of the legal definition of blasphemy can be found in various sources, including
Patrick, supra note 45, at 196-207.
126. Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 213 (1838).
127. Reg. v. Ramsay, (1883) 15 Cox C.C. 231 (Q.B.D.) at 238.
128. See Harris,supra note 59, at 218 ("Whether the common law definition also requires
the publication of the scurrilous material must be likely to produce a breach of the peace is
disputed"). Before the common law crime of blasphemy was abolished in England, a court in
2007 stated that
[T]he elements of the offence are common ground. First, there must be
contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous and/or ludicrous material relating to God,
Christ, the bible or the formularies of the Church of England. Second, the
publication must be such as tends to endanger society as a whole, by
endangering the peace, depraving public morality, shaking the fabric of society
or tending to cause civil strife.
Re. Green v. City of Westminster Magistrates' Court, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 2785 [11].
129. See, e.g., Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 296 (Can.) ("No person shall be
convicted of an offence under this section for expressing in good faith and in decent language,
or attempting to establish by argument used in good faith and conveyed in decent language, an
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common law tradition" obscure the many variations within that
tradition, and do not even begin to address the legal meaning of
blasphemy in countries outside of that tradition. Even though
commonalities exist, the simple truth is that just as "blasphemy" means
something different to every religion, it also means something different
in every legal system.
If religion were to fade as an influential force in a society and its
legal system, would blasphemy as an operative concept fade away as
well? In other words, is the concept of blasphemy so tied to the concept
of religion that the two cannot exist without each other? The thesis
advanced in this Article is that, while blasphemy requires a notion of the
sacred, the sacred need not be conceived of in a religious fashion.130
That is, the concept of blasphemy is useful in understanding how social
and legal pressure can be brought to bear on nonconformists or
provocateurs who challenge the secular ideals that a society holds as
sacred.
"Cultural blasphemy" exists because, although in theory modernism
and rationalism go hand-in-hand, and social values or concepts should
be defended on their own merits in the marketplace of ideas, in reality
every society, culture, or nation-state has certain notions that are more
or less "off-limits" to normal criticism and debate. Blasphemy against
the secular sacred may be punished by the legal system in the same
fashion that blasphemy against the religiously sacred is punished,
though of course the laws will be given different names and perhaps
different justifications.
The concept of "cultural blasphemy" can be illustrated through
examples. Patriotism is a common expectation in nation-states, and
perceived disrespect, even though it may have no tangible
consequences, will be seen in an unfavourable light.' 3 ' The following
examples are illustrative: desecrating a flag in the United States was
commonly prohibited before such laws were narrowly struck down by
the Supreme Court;132 the requirement to swear an oath to "be faithful
and bear true allegiance" to the Queen is still a bar to principled antimonarchist immigrants who wish to become citizens in Canada;133 and a
opinion on a religious subject"); Defamation Act 2009, supra note 47 ("It shall be a defence ...
for the defendant to prove that a reasonable person would find genuine literary, artistic, political,
scientific, or academic value in the matter to which the offence relates"); Criminal Code Act
1924 (Tas.), supra note 63 ("It is not an offence under this section to express in good faith and
in decent language . .. any opinion whatever upon any religious subject").
130. See PLATE, supra note 1, at 28 ("[i]n the contemporary world, targets of blasphemy
are often shifted from the traditionally sacred-gods, prophets, and holy books-to the 'gods of
modernity' such as the nation-state, education, friendship, and freedom of expression").
131. See id. at 163-69.
132. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418-20 (1989).
133. See Roach v. Canada (Att'y Gen.) (2009), 185 C.R.R. (2d) 215 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.
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passing remark that the United States was "cowardly" in its use of
cruise missiles was enough for comedian Bill Maher to lose his nightly
network talk show.134 A professed belief in the perfect equality of the
sexes and racial groups is arguably de rigueur in certain circles, as
demonstrated by the controversy over former Harvard President
Lawrence Summers' comments on possible "innate differences"
between men and women when it comes to math and science,' or the
uproar over the Bell Curve's suggestion that there may be racial
differences in intelligence.' 3 6 Challenges to the social idealization of
parenthood may be met with overwhelming vehemence, as
demonstrated by the "firestorm of controversy" that resulted when a
mother wrote in an English newspaper that her children were
"boring." ' 3 7 Holocaust denial is a good example of "cultural
blasphem Y91 38 and remains punishable as a criminal offence in several
countries.
The common factor that sets "cultural blasphemy" apart from
normal social or political controversy is the swift, almost intuitive,
anger that blasphemous remarks cause in listeners, an anger that can
become so intense that the result is a cry for suppression or
condemnation rather than thoughtful response or informed debate.
"Cultural blasphemy" as a concept is a useful one because it may shed
light on the difference between what a democratic society professes to
cherish (the search for truth, an open and fair exchange of ideas), and
J.).
134. Cathal Kelly, Bill Maher Uses the Word You Can Never Use, TORONTO STAR, Sept.
15, 2010, available at http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/861302--bill-maher-uses-theword-you-can-never-use.
135. James Bone, HarvardPresident Faces Faculty Revolt Over Sexism Claims, TIMES
(U.K.), Feb. 17, 2005, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life and style/education/
student/news/article515309.ece.
136. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE
AND CLASS STRucTuRE INAMERICAN LIFE 269-315 (1994).

137. C6sar G. Soriano, "Bored" by Her Kids, She's Getting It Full-Bore, USA TODAY,
July 31, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2006-07-30-bored-mom x.
htm. This is a good example of how the "problem" of blasphemy can be addressed through
strong social pressure geared towards forcing the blasphemer to conform to mainstream values.
Laws are unnecessary where the power of public opinion suffices. See also RICHARD WEBSTER,
A BRIEF HISTORY OF BLASPHEMY: LIBERALISM, CENSORSHIP AND "THE SATANIC VERSES" 25-26

(1990) (discussing how, in the context of blasphemy against Christianity in the West, "the
restraints of good taste have gradually made the restraints of the law all but redundant" and that
"[b]ecause of this process individuals or organi[z]ations can, to a large extent, be relied upon to
impose the kind of censorship which was once enforced by the state").
138. See PLATE, supra note 1, at 100 ("Denial, belittling, or making fun of the Holocaust
evokes judgments that are parallel to the responses against blasphemers").
139. See Peter R. Teachout, Making "Holocaust Denial" a Crime: Reflections on
European Anti-Negationist Laws From the Perspective of U.S. Constitutional Experience, 30
VT. L. REV. 655, 656 n.9 (2006) (listing nine countries with Holocaust denial laws).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

21

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 2

208

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23

what its people actually care about the most.
These three conceptions of blasphemy-religious, legal, and
cultural-provide a starting point for asking deeper questions: "why do
people blaspheme," and "what are the perceived harms of blasphemy?"
IV. WHY

Do PEOPLE BLASPHEME?

The issue of blasphemy is often looked at through the lenses of
legality and legitimacy, with the focal point being the traditional tension
between individual rights and social needs. Thus, blasphemy is seen as
leading to a contest between "freedom of speech" on the one hand and
"religious sensibilities" on the other, and the balancing process of
divergent interests, familiar to law students around the world, takes
center stage. However, abstract general concepts like "freedom of
speech," although necessary at an analytical level, tend to obscure
differences between the various components that make up those
concepts. Thus, to understand if, how, or why blasphemous speech
should be afforded protection under the general rubric of free
expression, an inquiry needs to be made into the very different reasons
people blaspheme. Some of these reasons are obvious, others less so,
but together they demonstrate that "blasphemy" may be a more complex
concept than generally thought.
A. Sincere Faith
Today, blasphemy is often thought of as something the irreligious
but historically, sincere differences in religious
do to the religious,
belief were the common cause of blasphemy prosecutions. Several
scholars have noted that the concept of blasphemy existed primarily as a
tool to enforce religious orthodoxy against dissidents whose
consciences led them to beliefs that the established churches found
heretical. For example, Alain Cabantous notes that "[iln light of the
tragic divisions that then so shattered the peace in post-Reformation
Europe-hardening adversaries and the lines separating professions of
the true faith-'the guilty'

were . . . religionists of the other

confession."l41 In the same context, Levy notes that "[flor most of
history, blasphemers have been devout Christians, although obnoxious

140. See, e.g., Talal Asad, FREE SPEECH, BLASPHEMY, AND SECULAR CRITICISM in IS CRITIQUE
SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 20, 56 (2009) (discussing "the obsessive need
to repeat again and again the words and images that secularists know will be regarded by the
pious with horror").
141. CABANTOUS, supra note 12, at 16.
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to the majority of Christians among whom they lived." 42 The same idea
holds true for the persecution of devout Ahmadis in Pakistan, who are
seen as "false" Muslims by the government.143 Of course, sincere
expressions of faith are not necessarily temperate expressions of faith,
and historically there are plenty of examples of believers articulating the
distinction between the "true faith" and all others using coarse and
strident language.'"
B. Oppression
The ability to suppress speech as "blasphemous" has traditionally
been held by those in power: judges, legislators, leaders of established
churches. Limiting the speech of minorities is a form of oppression, but
so too can be blasphemy against the minority's beliefs. The ability to
blaspheme with impunity against a religion is a show of power (by the
blasphemer) and a show of powerlessness (by those blasphemed
against). The destruction by the Taliban of 1700 year-old Buddhist
statues in Afghanistan is a good example of this type of blasphemy,145
as is, to some critics, the publication of the cartoons mocking
Muhammad in Denmark, a country where Muslims are heavily

outnumbered.146
C. Resistance
One response to oppression is resistance, and blasphemy against the
dominant beliefs in a society can be a powerful tool for those in the
minority. In this context, blasphemy serves as an act of defiance, a show
of unity, or even a rallying cry and call to arms for the faithful. When an
142.

LEONARD W. LEVY, BLASPHEMY: VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM

MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE ix (1993) [hereinafter BLASPHEMY]. See also Cox, supra note 34, at

8 ("A remarkable feature of the blasphemy prosecutions in the 17th-19th centuries, was the fact
that they frequently involved genuinely religious defendants . .
143. See infra Part II.D.
144. See LEVY, supra note 116, at 332 ("Inoffensive speech was not the hallmark of Elijah,
Isaiah, or of Jesus himself; Paul, Athanasius, Augustine, Luther, Calvin, Fox, and other
champions of true faith pursued a tradition of vehement denunciation"); F. LAGARD SMITH,
BLASPHEMY AND THE BATTLE FOR FAITH 73 (1990) ("Looking back to Biblical illustrations,

Jesus and John the Baptist probably would not fare very well in today's society if they insisted
on using modem linguistic equivalents of 'you brood of vipers,' 'you hypocrites', and 'son of
hell.').
145. See Ahmed Rashid, After 1,700 Years, Buddhas Fall to Taliban Dynamite,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Mar. 12, 2001, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
asia/afghanistan/i 326063/After- 1700-years-Buddhas-fall-to-Taliban-dynamite.html.
146. See, e.g., Cindy Holder, Debating the Danish Cartoons: Civil Rights or Civil Power?,
55 U.N.B.L.J.. 179, 183 (2006) (arguing that the cartoons, and the lack of an apology, "[are] not
about rights, [they are] about power").
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Anglican priest put up a vehemently anti-Catholic poster in the
overwhelmingly Catholic Quebec of 1936,147 the display clearly had
more to do with notions of resistance than mere theological differences.
Blasphemy of this type can serve to bind a religious minority together,
setting them apart from mainstream society. The polemical and
inflammatory language used by Jehovah's Witnesses in the early
twentieth century was driven by both religious zeal and a constant
apprehension of persecution.14 8
D. Accident
If the essence of blasphemy is that the sacred has been tarnished by
the profane, then logically it does not necessarily matter why the
blasphemous act took place. In other words, the good intentions or nonmalevolent mental state of the blasphemer cannot erase the fact that
blasphemy occurred, nor is it enough to absolve the blasphemer of guilt.
In English common law, blasphemy was a strict liability offense-if it
could be proven that the defendant intended to utter or publish material
that turned out to be blasphemous, it was doctrinally of no consequence
whether or not he intended to blaspheme.149 The idea that blasphemy
could take place unintentionally is borne out in some cases, ancient and
modern. In Ireland in 1855, a Reverend Petcherine had given a series of
sermons on the danger of "evil" literature (popular novels and the like)
and then invited his listeners to bring bundles of the books for a public
burning.15 0 Unbeknownst to Petcherine, a copy of the Bible somehow
ended up in the flames, and Petcherine was promptly charged with
147. See R. v. Rahard, (1935) 65 C.C.C. 344, 345-46 (Can. Que. C.S.P.).
148. See WILLIAM KAPLAN, STATE AND SALVATION: THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES AND THEIR

FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 11 (1989) ("[Als more and more Jehovah's Witnessses were arrested in

the 1930s, the literature of the group became increasingly intemperate. The Jehovah's Witnesses
blamed the Roman Catholic hierarchy for the 'persecution' they were forced to endure, and the
church was portrayed in insulting terms in their literature"); Allen Rostron, Demythologizing the
Legal History of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the FirstAmendment, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 493,
498 (2004) (reviewing SHAwN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS
PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000)) (arguing that "the legal

struggles served even more fundamental needs for the Witnesses, setting them apart from others,
indulging their need for opposition and adversity, and reassuring them that they were indeed a
special people to God").
149. See Whitehouse v. Gay News Ltd., (1979) 68 Crim. App. R. 381, 394 (HL) (Viscount
Dilhome) ("If it be accepted, as I think it must, that that which is sought to prevent is the
publication of blasphemous libels, the harm is done by their intentional publication, whether or
not the publisher intended to blaspheme."); Law Commission, 'Offences Against Religion and
Public Worship' (Law Com No 79, 1981)[6.7] ("[t]he practical consequence of the exclusion of
any requirement as to the intent of the defendant to blaspheme is that he cannot give admissible
evidence as to what he claims to be his beliefs and purpose").
150. See O'Higgins,supra note 34, at 163.
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blasphemy-fortunately, the jury acquitted him.' 5 ' A well-known recent
example of accidental blasphemy is that of the British national, teaching
at a children's school in the Sudan, who allowed her students to name
the class teddy bear "Muhammad." 5 2 Arguably, some common types of
profanity in North America fall into this category-blasphemous
expressions uttered in anger, like "God Damn" or "Jesus Christ" rarely
include any intent to make a religious statement; they are simply
markers of cultural inheritance.
E. Provocation:Art, Satire,Literature
The taboo, shocking nature of blasphemy is exactly what makes it
useful in creative endeavours. Although an artist may want to be
provocative simply for the sake of being provocative, or funny for the
sake of being funny, blasphemy holds other possibilities. In a world
saturated with images, ideas, and viewpoints, the strategic deployment
of blasphemy can get people to stop and pay attention-whether out of
surprise, anger, or mirth. The hope, presumably, behind Salman
Rushdie's blasphemous portrayal of Muhammad in the Satanic Verses
was for readers to come away with questions about the nature of
revelation, historical truth, and faith. 153 Similarly, the most famous of
the Danish Muhammad cartoons, that of Muhammad wearing a turban
shaped like a bomb,154 has a larger point to make-whether true or
not-about the role of violence and extremism in Islam.
The blasphemous writer or artist is by nature a gambler: he or she is
betting that once the initial shock of seeing the blasphemous work wears
off, the viewer retains the presence of mind to grasp the larger idea
behind it. In other words, blasphemy is a risky tool for provoking
thought-a passerby who sees an image of Jesus Christ wearing Mickey
Mouse ears 5 5 might reflect on the influence of capitalism and
commercialism in mainstream society, but that person could just as well
be insulted and walk away, resisting any further attempts to establish
the truth of the proposition that the artist is making. Thus, if the
question is "does blasphemy work," the only sensible answer seems to
be "sometimes." It is clearly extremely effective at gaining attention,
and attempts to suppress blasphemous speech often have the ironic
151. See id.
152. See British Teacher Held in Sudan for Calling Teddy Bear "Mohammed" Could Be
Jailedfor Sedition, DAILY MAIL (U.K.), Nov. 27, 2007, available at http://www.dailymail.co.
uk/news/article-496460/British-teacher-held-Sudan-calling-teddy-bear-Mohammed-jailed-sedit
ion.html.
153. See generally SALMAN RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (Viking, 1988).
154. The cartoons are available on various Internet websites, and a reproduction of the
cartoon discussed is reprinted in PLATE, supra note 1, at 18.
155. See Nowak, supra note 11.
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effect of making blasphemers into martyrs whose condemnation vaults
them (and their work) into the headlines.
The reasons why people may blaspheme listed here-sincere faith,
oppression, resistance, accident, and provocation-do not exhaust the
field, and additional examples can surely be found at varying levels of
generality and specificity. A discussion of the motivations behind
blasphemous speech allows for the creation of a continuum of the legal
treatment of blasphemous speech. At one end is the strict liability
approach exemplified by early English common law, which prohibited
blasphemy, regardless of why the defendant uttered it.156 At the other
end would be an approach that constitutionally guarantees the right to
blaspheme for almost any reason-the law in the United States. 7 At
various points in between would be those countries that still prohibit
blasphemy, but make convictions dependent upon whether or not the
defendant could establish that the speech was made for a "religious,"
"artistic," "scientific," or some other "legitimate" purpose.15 8
V. THE HARMS OF BLASPHEMY, REAL OR PERCEIVED

The curious persistence of blasphemy laws and their modem
counterparts requires explanation. What is it about blasphemous speech
that necessitates its prohibition in a vast array of cultures stretching
back through time and across the globe? Is it prohibited simply from an
intuitive sense that "blasphemy is wrong," or are there real harms
arising from blasphemous speech that legitimate its suppression? The
perceived harms of blasphemous speech have, in some countries,
changed dramatically over the centuries, and the decisions of judges and
legislators over which harms are real and which are imaginary help to
determine the scope and enforcement of blasphemy laws.
A. Divine Wrath
The precise way in which a religion conceives of the divine affects
how blasphemy will be viewed in that religion, and the culture and
society to which it belongs. The distant, "watchmaker" God of the
Deists takes no notice of blasphemy. However, if the god or gods of a
156. See generally Whitehouse v. Gay News Ltd., (1979) 68 Cr. App. R. 381 (HL);
SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES, VOLUME I-REPORT
(House of Lords), 2002-03, HL Paper 95-I, 19 (indicating that the offense of blasphemy is
"one of strict liability. That is to say, intent to commit an act of blasphemy is irrelevant; all that
matters is whether the accused did in fact publish material that is the subject of prosecution").
157. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1952) (excluding true threats, fighting
words, and the like).
158. See, e.g., Defamation Act 2009, supra note 47.
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religion
are
attributed
certain
characteristics-omniscience,
omnipotence, and anthropomorphic emotions such as anger, jealousy,
and vengefulness-then it logically follows that blasphemy can incur
swift and painful retribution from on high. The wrathful and violent
God depicted in what Christians call the Old Testament exemplifies a
divine being willing and able to respond to blasphemy by punishing not
just the blasphemer, but also his entire family or community.159 In this
context, a society prohibits blasphemy almost as a form of self-defense,
as a way to protect itself from divine wrath by demonstrating that the
blasphemer is not representing the community as a whole. A perfect
example of this fear comes from a speech by Georges Vanier, a
Brigadier General for the Canadian armed forces during World War
II. As part of a public campaign against blasphemy, Vanier tells about
an incident that took place while he was leadin§ troops on the battlefield
and accompanies it with evocative imagery.' 1 The reader pictures a
brave group of men advancing quietly across a darkened battlefield,
moving quietly in single file toward the barbed wire and trenches that
mark the enemy's front line. Suddenly shells burst overhead, and one of
Vanier's men utters undisclosed blasphemies. 162 "These blasphemies,"
Vanier says, "[when] we were so close to death, filled me with fear
because blasphemy brings divine curses. I managed to reach the
blasphemer and ask him[,] 'What is it that Christ did to you, my friend,
that you offend him so?' He trembled like a child and burst into
tears."' 63
B. Moral Degradation
If one of the justifications for prohibiting blasphemous speech was
fear of the direct and very tangible punishments an angry god could
mete out, the fear often operated alongside a far more diffuse anxiety
that blasphemy undermined society itself. Although speculative and
unproven, the concern was that blasphemy operated to diminish public
morality and respect for the established religion, which in turn
weakened social bonds, the sanctity of oaths, and even allegiance to the
state.164 In early English common law, for example, the state and
159. See, e.g., 2 Kings 19:6-7.
160. See DON'T BLASPHEME (Pamphlet) (Current Events in Tracts No. 20) in Campagne
contre le blaspheme, Ottawa, National Archives of Canada (MG 32-A2, Vol. 14, File 16)
(Vanier fonds) (all translations mine). Vanier, his campaign against blasphemy, and this
anecdote are discussed at more length in Jeremy Patrick, CanadianBlasphemy Law in Context:
Press, Legislative, andPublic Reactions, 16 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 129, 158-62 (2010).
161. See Patrick,supra note 160, at 158-59.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., The People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (stating that
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Christianity were so closely identified that blasphemy was viewed as a
form of sedition:' 65 as Hale noted in Taylor's Case, "[flor to say,
religion is a cheat, is to dissolve all those obligations whereby the civil
societies are preserved, and [because] Christianity is parcel of the laws
of England . . . to reproach the Christian religion is to speak in
subversion of the law." 6 Blasphemy has also been viewed as a form of

profanity or obscenity, 167 with its prohibition paternalistically justified
as necessary to protect the impressionable morals of women, children,
and the naive. 168 In modem times, proponents of blasphemy
prohibitions have largely abandoned arguments based on the diffuse
fear of moral degradation in favor of justifications relating to
discrimination and breaches of the peace. However, there are still those
who believe that blasphemy statutes (even if rarely enforced) serve an
important symbolic function in setting forth the moral standards that a

blasphemous statements "are punishable because they strike at the root of moral obligation, and
weaken the security of the social ties."). See also Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Validity of
Blasphemy Statutes or Ordinances, 41 A.L.R.3d 519, § 3[a] (WL 2006) (referencing State v.
Mokus, in which the court reasoned that "any word or deed which would expose the God of the
Christian religion, or the Holy Scriptures, 'to contempt and ridicule,' . . . would rob official
oaths of any of their sanctity, thus undermining the foundations of their binding force . . .");
Clive Unsworth, Blasphemy, CulturalDivergence and Legal Relativism, 58 MOD. L. REV. 658,
666 (1995) (discussing blasphemy as a crime concerned with the "social value of maintaining
respect for a sense of reverence for the sacred" and noting that "[i]t is the tenuous and intangible
nature of the harm against which the offence protects that causes especial outrage to liberal
exponents of the pre-eminent value of freedom of expression").
165. See Whitehouse v. Gay News Ltd., (1979) 68 Cr. App. R. 381, 384 (HL) (Lord
Diplock), where the court stated that
In the post-Restoration politics of seventeenth and eighteenth century England,
Church and State were thought to stand or fall together. To cast doubt on the
doctrines of the established church or to deny the truth of the Christian faith
upon which it was founded was to attack the fabric of society itself; so
blasphemous and seditious libel were criminal offences that went hand in hand.
Id.
166. Taylor's Case, (1675) 86 E.R. 189, 189. See also Note, Blasphemy, 70 COLUMBIA L.
REV. 694, 698 (1970) (stating that, although the rationale in Taylor's Case is "not entirely
clear," it is probably "that the fabric of society itself is weakened by mockery or questioning of
the foundations of law, one of which is the Christian religion").
167. See WEBSTER, supra note 137, at 23 ("there has always been a close relationship
between obscenity laws and blasphemy laws, with obscene or scurrilous language tending to be
construed as one of the characteristics of blasphemy"); LEVY, supra note 142, at 506 (discussing
how in American cases "[slometimes profanity and blasphemy were treated as almost
interchangeable").
168. See, e.g., Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, at 290 ("Nothing could be more offensive to the
virtuous part of the community, or more injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to
declare such profanity lawful").
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nation expects from its citizens.1 69
C. Offense and Discrimination
Blasphemy upsets people. This is a simplistic way of putting it, but
it cuts to the core of why blasphemy laws persist, in one fashion or
another, in modem times. Abstract discussion of blasphemy as
transgressing the barrier between the sacred and the profane should not
obscure the fact that blasphemy provokes emotional responses. When
that emotion is anger, the resulting violence can lead to social unrest
and breaches of the peace-a topic discussed in the next section. When
that emotion is shock, dismay, and sadness, it can (arguably) become
psychologically harmful to the individual. 170 In the context of the
Danish Muhammad cartoons, for example, Saba Mahmood writes: "[a]t
the time of their initial publication, I was struck by the sense of
personal loss expressed by many devout Muslims on hearing about or
seeing the cartoons. While many of those I interviewed condemned the
they nonetheless expressed a sense of grief and
violent demonstrations,
17 1
sorrow."
The need to protect the religious sensibilities of minorities can be
seen as even more vital in countries that strive to be multicultural,
diverse, and tolerant. 172 Some advocates would go a step further and
169. See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON RELIGIOUS OFFENCES IN ENGLAND AND WALES,
VOLUME I-REPORT (House of Lords), 2002-03, HL Paper 95-1, 34 ("Many think that the

law on blasphemy offers much more than legal protection; they believe it to be an expression of
the fabric of our society, of the values on which our relationships with one another depend, of
our constitutional heritage, and of the nature of our national identity"); SMITH, supra note 144,
at 14-15 ("Some people think it is desirable to keep blasphemy laws on the books, just as they
are, but without actively enforcing them. Their idea is that even unenforced blasphemy laws
could 'make a public statement' about the seriousness of religious libel").
170. The argument is most clearly seen in laws that may function as modem-day
counterparts to blasphemy laws, such as those prohibiting "religious vilification" and "religious
hate propaganda." See Harris,supra note 59, at 223 ("The argument therefore is that blasphemy
is really a species of vilification law, analogous to laws penalising racial vilification"); Ahdar,
supra note 70, at 295-97 (discussing discrimination and psychological harm in the context of
religious vilification); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 64 ("It is indisputable that the
emotional damage caused by words may be of grave psychological and social consequence") &
119 (discussing "the severe psychological trauma suffered by members of those identifiable
groups targeted by hate propaganda"); Canada v. Taylor, [1990] 3. S.C.R. 892, 1 40 ("The
Cohen Committee noted that individuals subjected to racial or religious hatred may suffer
substantial psychological distress, the damaging consequences including a loss of self-esteem,

feeling of anger and outrage and strong pressure to renounce cultural differences that mark them
as distinct").
171. Saba Mahmood, "Religious Reason and Secular Affect: An Incommensurable
Divide?," in Is CRITIQUE SECULAR? BLASPHEMY, INJURY, AND FREE SPEECH 74 (2009).

172. See, e.g., Whitehouse v. Gay News Ltd., 68 Cr. App. R. 381, 404 (HL) (Lord
Scarman) ("In an increasingly plural society such as that of modem Britain it is necessary not
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argue that speech contemptuous or dismissive of the religious beliefs of
minorities exposes them to an increased risk of actual discrimination
and even violence.173 History is sometimes drawn into the debate, with
the rise of anti-Semitism in early Nazi Germany and public advocacy of
ethnic cleansing in Rwanda cited as examples of the harms of hateful
speech towards minorities.
This Article has tended to treat blasphemy and religious
vilification/hatred as if they were the same thing. Conceptually, this is a
mistake; the two offenses have different historical antecedents, address
different perceived threats, and, most importantly, are distinguishable
(theoretically) on the ground that blasphemy attacks beliefs, while
religious vilification/hatred attacks believers. 74 The belief/believers
distinction lies at the heart of why mainstream Western liberals who
would be aghast at the introduction of blasphemy legislation designed to
protect orthodoxy may be quite supportive of religious
vilification/hatred laws designed to protect minorities.175
A crucial question arises: even if the belief and believers distinction
is conceptually sound, is drawing the distinction meaningful and
only to respect the differing religious beliefs, feelings, and practices of all but also to protect
them from scurrility, vilification, ridicule, and contempt"); Ahdar, supra note 70, at 294
("Religious vilification laws endeavour to strike a balance between several policy aims and
objectives. There is a broad desire to promote religious tolerance. This in turn ... derives from a
broader policy endorsing multiculturalism"). In a decision upholding the validity of domestic
blasphemy laws, the European Commission on Human Rights stated that "the offence of
blasphemous libel as it is construed under the applicable common law in fact has the main
purpose to protect the right of citizens not to be offended in their religious feelings by
publications." Gay News Ltd. and Lemon v. U.K., No. 8710/79, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 123, 130
(1983) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
173. See the discussion in Ahdar, supra note 70, at 297, stating that
The argument that vilification can indirectly contribute to discrimination, abuse
or even violence is a more difficult charge to dismiss. If insulting and
contemptuous words or written material feed the animosity of those who might
later express that hatred in criminal conduct, then logic does suggest it might be
prudent to nip this pernicious process in the bud. But the linkage here is
indirect, conjectural and rather diffuse. Some sorts of disparaging or
inflammatory speech may provoke improper conduct in some hearers in some
circumstances.
Id. (emphasis in original quotation omitted).
174. See Harris,supra note 59, at 224 ("[B]lasphemy consists in vilification of Christian
beliefs (rather than believers). . . . Racial vilification consists of hostile expression directed
towards a person on the basis of some characteristic"); Aroney, supra note 14, at 313 n.155
("[T]he line between inciting hatred of beliefs and inciting hatred of persons may be a difficult
one to draw[,] [b]ut by proscribing only the incitement of hatred against persons or groups, the
[religious vilification] legislation calls for the distinction to be made").
175. A brief analysis of the scope of traditional blasphemous libel laws compared to
religious hate propaganda laws in Canada is in Patrick, supra note 45, at 237-38.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss2/2

30

Patrick: The Curious Persistence of Blasphemy

2011]1

THE CURIOUS PERSISTENCE OF BLASPHEMY

217

feasible? Supporters of the distinction suggest that "[t]he distinction is
nevertheless a real one, however hard it may be to draw,"17 and that,
for example, there is "a crucial difference between saying 'you Catholic
bastard' on the one hand and 'Christ was a charlatan on the other."' 7 7
Opponents argue that, subjectively the religiously faithful will feel the
same amount of hatred or contempt whether they hear attacks on their
In this vein, Joel
beliefs or attacks on themselves as believers.
Harrison argues:
There can be no bright line between criticising doctrine and
criticising a person who adheres to it. For many, religion forms
the centrepiece of life, dearly cherished beliefs, criticism of
which evinces a personal attack. In this way there is no real
difference between saying "Christianity is evil" as opposed to
"all Christians are evil"-both both have the potential to incite
religious hatred.1 79
Even if a meaningful distinction exists, the ability of human rights
commissions, judges, and individuals to reliably draw the distinction
when faced with the vast spectrum of debate and criticism of religion
appears dubious.' 8 0 The conclusion here is that even if religious
vilification and hatred laws have the best of intentions, they likely have
the practical effect of transporting blasphemy prohibitions into the
twenty-first century.
176. Ahdar, supra note 70, at 310.
177. Harris, supra note 59, at 224.
178. See Feenan, supra note 67, at 156 ("The distinction appears difficult, if not
impossible, to justify in relation to expression. It resonates with that equally fallacious
dichotomy that is used to justify homophobia; love the sinner, but not the sin. The religious
beliefs or activities of individuals are intimately tied to religion, and vice versa"); Harrison,
supra note 72, at 95 ("Religious vilification laws attempt to draw a distinction between
criticising an ideology and inciting hatred against a person, but this neglects the fundamental
nature of religious belief-any attack against beliefs and doctrine is felt personally by its
adherents").
179. Harrison, supra note 72, at 78.
180. Consider the following statements, some of which are clearly targeted at beliefs,
others clearly targeted at believers: "The doctrine of transubstantiation is stupid;" "The Catholic
doctrine of transubstantiation is stupid;" "People who believe in the doctrine of
transubstantiation are stupid;" "Catholics are stupid for believing in the doctrine of
transubstantiation;" "Catholics are stupid." Can we reliably place ourselves in the shoes of the
"average" orthodox Catholic hearing these statements, and predict which are more or less likely
to cause hurt feelings or potentially lead to an atmosphere conductive to discrimination and
violence? Moreover, can we reliably predict how courts and human rights tribunals will respond
to this array of statements? All laws have grey areas and can bring forth hard cases, but the
"belief/believer" distinction so crucial to religious vilification/hatred laws seems to create few if
any "easy" cases.
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D. Breaches of the Peace and Social Unrest
"Blasphemy laws recogni[z]e what blasphemy produces: gut-level
outrage! It is that welling up of the emotions that makes a peaceful

person want to throttle somebody."' 8 ' The need to prevent breaches of
the peace is a staple in arguments for the existence of blasphemy
laws.182 In English common law, an actual breach of the peace did not
need to be established, nor even a likelihood of a breach of the peaceall that was necessary was to show a possibility that a breach of the
peace could take place.183
For most of the twentieth century, the argument that blasphemy laws
were necessary to preserve social order probably seemed far-fetched.1 84
The reported cases never involved actual breaches of the peace, and
even if a hypothetical street corner blasphemer received a bloody nose
from an irate listener from time to time, government censorship of a
whole swath of material hardly seemed warranted. However, new life
was breathed into this old justification after the violent protests over the
Satanic Verses (which led to at least two murders and twelve riotrelated deaths),' 5 and the Danish Muhammad cartoons (which led to
over 100 riot-related deaths worldwide), 8 6 not to mention the more
recent "International Burn a Koran Day."' 8 7 Blasphemy laws and their
modern-day counterparts receive a new urgency when incidents have
ramifications beyond the local and into the global. Indeed, if judges
begin looking at blasphemy prohibitions as a matter of national security
181. SMITH, supranote 144, at 48.

182. See I.D. Leigh, Not to Judge But to Save: The Development of the Law of Blasphemy,
8 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 56, 68 (1977) ("The justification for the offence must, therefore, be seen as
a secular one: to prevent breaches of the peace and to protect individuals from insult to their
religious feelings"); Note, Blasphemy, supra note 166, at 701 ("As a corollary to the offense to
religious sensibilities, there was always the assumption that a religious insult might lead to a
breach of the peace by the hearer").
183. See In re John William Gott, (1922) 16 Cr. App. R. 87, 88-89 (Justice Avory); Law
Commission, supra note 149, at [3.3] (discussing "vestigial" nature of the breach of the peace
element in blasphemy prosecutions); LEVY, supra note 142, at 543 (discussing 1970s British
blasphemy case and noting that the trial judge "held that the publication need not intend to
breach the peace but must just create a tendency toward such a breach; the mere possibility that
it might exist, not the probability, sufficed").
184. See SMITH, supra note 144, at 45 ("Perhaps there was a time when religious dissent or
contemptuous ridicule amounted to 'fighting words,' but the rarity of cases alone (five between
1883 and 1922, and only one since) would suggest that breach of the peace over religious issues
is hardly likely").
185. See Cox, supra note 34, at 37 & 37 n.62.
186. See Joshua Foster, Prophets, Cartoons, and Legal Norms: Rethinking the United
Nations Defamationof Religion Provisions,48 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 19, 22-23 (2009).
187. Lauren Russell, Church Plans Quran-burning Event, CNN NEWS, July 30, 2010,
available at http://articles.cnn.com/2010-07-29/us/florida.burn.quran.daylquran-burningflorida-church-terry-jones-american-muslims-religion?_s=PM:US.
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and foreign policy,' it is difficult to foresee what the future holds in
this area of law.
Weighing the harms of blasphemy in the abstract is a difficult (and
arguably impossible) task because of the nature of its effectblasphemy attacks beliefs. Because beliefs have no legal standing and
no fixed value, an assessment of damages is impossible. Proxies for the
harm to beliefs-divine anger, social morality, social unrest, and
individual grief-are similarly of an incalculable nature. Thus, while
justifications for prohibiting blasphemy can involve reasons-some less
persuasive in modem liberal societies (fear of divine wrath for
example), others more so (fear of prejudice and discrimination)-they
can rarely include evidence.
How can it be proven that one or several acts of blasphemy have
depraved public morality or led to an atmosphere conducive to
discrimination? In the one area where a causal tie can be established
between a particular act of blasphemy and a particular harm (breaches
of the peace) there is another difficulty. Out of all the blasphemous
utterances ever made, why did these particular blasphemous utterances
lead to violent altercations and protests? In other words, what is the risk
or likelihood of more violence taking place if a future, unrelated
blasphemous utterance were allowed? Anecdotes, religious faith, and
intuitive notions of right and wrong are far more likely to be deployed
in support of the suppression of blasphemy than are careful research
studies. Of course, if the harms of blasphemy are often abstract and
incalculable, so too are the benefits of allowing it-the value of
freedom of speech cannot be placed on a scale and weighed. This
dilemma helps to explain the curious persistence of blasphemy and the
recurring battle between blasphemy and free speech.
VI. CONCLUSION

Blasphemy laws in some form or another remain a part of most legal
systems around the world. They may be changed, renamed,
deemphasized, or revitalized, but they will not disappear anytime
soon. 89 As the threshold between the sacred and the profane, the
188. Cf George Stephanopoulos, Justice Stephen Breyer: Is Burning Koran "Shouting
Fire in a Crowded Theater"?, ABC NEWS Sept. 14, 2010, available at http://blogs.abcnews.
com/george/2010/09/justice-stephen-breyer-is-burning-koran-shouting-fire-in-a-crowded-thea
ter.html (discussing statement of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer that relationship of
First Amendment to Koran burning an issue for future courts and questioning whether or not it
is akin to shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre).
189. The mere existence of blasphemy and religious vilification/hatred laws should be kept
in context, however. Actual enforcement of the laws may be rather rare in many countries. This
is not to say this whole discussion about blasphemy has been "much ado about nothing," but as
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concept of blasphemy-religious, legal, or cultural-expresses
something fundamental about human nature. The drive to push against
boundaries, to provoke thoughts which at first seem abhorrent and then
become accepted, to express truth in the face of pain, imprisonment, and
death, always remains present in some members of a society, whether
that society be democratic or totalitarian. Similarly, the fear of
blasphemy-incarnated as the risk of angering God, disrupting society,
hurting minorities, or something else-points to the drive for
conformity and unity by societies and institutions, be they State,
Church, Community, or Family. The need to blaspheme and the need to
suppress blasphemy continue to persist, and perhaps the only truly
curious aspect is why we ever thought they would fade away to begin
with.

Levy noted, "[1liberals too often behave like Chicken Little, giving the impression that one case
of suppression means the sky is falling and Shakespeare will be next." LEvY, supra note 142, at
576.
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